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Abstract
A quantum seal is a way of encoding a classical message into quantum states,
so that everybody can read the message error-free, but at the same time the
sender and all intended readers who have some prior knowledge of the quantum
seal, can check if the seal has been broken and the message read. The verification
is done without reading nor disturbing the sealed message.
1 Introduction
Before the age of electronic transfer of information, important letters and
documents were often closed using a wafer of molten wax into which was
pressed the distinctive seal of the sender [1]. This was meant to fulfill
different purposes, namely the authentication of the sender, but it also
enabled the receiver to verify that the letter or document had not been
opened and read by a third party. This is refered to as a classical seal.
It is important to notice the following points. The sender is not com-
mitted to the content, since she can always change her mind, write a new
letter and seal it. Moreover the receiver needs to have prior knowledge of
the symbol of the seal in order to verify that it is actually authentic —
but still it could be falsified and in principle the only person who can truly
verify that the seal and the content is authentic is the sender. Even further,
the seal can be broken by anyone who wishes to learn the content of the
letter, by simply physically breaking the seal, and then open and read the
letter.
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In this paper the idea for making a Quantum Seal is presented. The
protocol belongs to the same category as quantum cryptography [2], quan-
tum bit commitment [3, 4], quantum signature [5] and authentication of
quantum messages [6] etc. For the quantum seal a classical message is en-
coded into quantum states, in such a way that the quantum seal can be
broken by anyone and the message read error-free. However it is possible
to verify if the message has been read by checking if the quantum seal has
been broken. The first goal is that this verification can be performed by
the sender. Ultimately the quantum seal will possess the same properties
as the classical seal, which means that anyone with some prior knowledge
about the quantum seal will be able to check if it has been broken.
A first implementation of the protocol for quantum seals will be pre-
sented. The encoding of the message is performed by using the simplest
form of classical error correction codes [7]. And the verification of the quan-
tum seal is performed by using the so-called ’SWAP-test’ [8]. Eventhough
this implementation is only resistant to single qubit attacks (see section 5)
it serves as a good illustration of the properties of quantum seals.
2 Encoding and verification by Alice
The first step in order to create the quantum seal is to find a way of encoding
a classical message into quantum states so that the encoder, Alice, can
always verify if the message has been read, i.e. she can check if the quantum
seal has been broken. At the same time anyone can actually read the
message. This can be achieved in a very simple way.
A classical message can be encoded into quantum states and read per-
fectly without errors by anyone if Alice writes the message using qubits
states always prepared in the same basis and then announces which basis
she used. For example, if she wants to write a string of bits, then she
could use the states | 0 〉 and | 1 〉 corresponding to the z (computational)
basis to signify 0 and 1 respectively, and then announce the basis she used.
This will allow anyone to measure the qubits in the correct basis and read
the message. But in this way, naturally Alice have no way of checking if
someone actually did read the message.
In order for Alice to be able to check if the message has been read, it
is necessary to add states from a different basis, which if measured in the
wrong basis will lead to errors — similarly to what is done in quantum
cryptography. Still, since everybody should be able to read the message
this has to be done in a clever way.
This can be done by encoding each classical bit into a block of three
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qubits in such a way that when measured in the basis announced by Alice,
the encoding is self-correcting, which means that the bit can be learned
without error. However, at the same time Alice can check that it has been
read. This can be achieved in the following way: Two of the qubits will
be prepared in the same state in the computational basis according to the
bit value Alice wants to write, the third qubit is a control qubit which is
prepared in a state from one of the mutually unbiased bases x and y. In
other words two of the qubits are prepared in the message reading-basis
(| 0 〉 and | 1 〉), whereas one control qubit will be in one of the four states
| 0x 〉, | 1x 〉, | 0y 〉 or | 1y 〉. The state and position of the control qubit is
chosen at random by Alice — the choice is done independently for each
block of qubits. This means that in each block of three qubits two qubits
are in the correct state, for example if Alice wants to write bit value 0, two
of the qubits will be in the state | 0 〉, whereas the state of the last qubit will
be chosen at random between the states from the other mutually unbiased
bases.
Now suppose Alice wants to write the classical bit sequence 0110..., then
there are many ways for her to encode it, one way would be the following:
| 0 〉| 0 〉| 0y 〉 bit number 1, value = 0
| 0x 〉| 1 〉| 1 〉 bit number 2, value = 1
| 1 〉| 0y 〉| 1 〉 bit number 3, value = 1
| 0 〉| 0x 〉| 0 〉 bit number 4, value = 0
...
where each triplet of states corresponds to the encoding of one bit. Since
Alice has announced in public which basis is the message reading-basis (here
chosen to be the computational basis, i.e. z basis), anyone can read it, but
it will automatically introduce errors which can be identified by Alice. But
since the encoding is self-correcting the message can nevertheless be read
without errors.
To see this, assume that the reader is always measuring in the correct
message reading-basis, then naturally all the states which are encoded in
this basis will be read perfectly without error. But in each triplet there
is one state which belongs to a basis which is mutually unbiased with the
reading-basis, and for this state the bit value 0 or 1 is found with equal
probability. For example | 0 〉| 0 〉| 0y 〉, when read in the computational ba-
sis, could result in either 000 or 001 — with equal probability. However,
since in each triplet there is only one control qubit, there can be at maxi-
mum one error and hence the correct bit value can be obtained by a simple
majority vote. Which means that the message can be read without error.
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On the other hand since the control qubit now has been measured in the
reading-basis, a subsequent measurement in the correct preparation basis
(in this case the y-basis) will lead to an error, with probability 1/2. This
will allow Alice at any stage to check if the message has been read, because
she can at any time measure each qubit in its preparation basis and if she
finds errors she will conclude that the seal has been broken and the message
read.
Notice an interesting thing, namely that it is only with probability 1/2
that the reader will learn the position of the control qubit. In the example
described above, with probability 1/2, the reader will find 000 from which
the position of the control bit can not be identified, whereas with proba-
bility 1/2 the result will be 001, from which it is obvious that the last bit
corresponds to the position of the control qubit — but, of course, the reader
learns nothing of the original state of the control qubit.
This part of the protocol enables everyone to read the message written
by Alice error free, but at the same time it enables Alice to check if the
quantum seal has been broken, because the message can not be read without
giving rise to errors.
3 Intended reader verification
At this point in the protocol, Alice has written and sealed (encoded) her
message into triplets of qubit states and stored them in a quantum memory
which is accessible by anyone. Which means that the sealed message is
now located in a public area. Notice that the sealed message is just a big
product state of N qubits, | φ1 〉| φ2 〉| φ2 〉 · · · | φN 〉, where | φi 〉 is the state
of the i′th qubit and where N = 3× (number of bits).
In order to have complete correspondence with the classical seal, not
only Alice should be able to verify that the seal has not been broken, but
all intended readers should be able to verify that the quantum seal is still
intact, without reading, nor disturbing the message written by Alice.
In the case of the classical seal the receiver is familiar with the design
of the symbol pressed into the wax, and uses this knowledge to identify the
letter received as authentic. This means that prior knowledge is required
in the classical case. For the quantum seal, this part of the protocol is
obtained by Alice preparing additional qubits which she then distributes
to the various intended readers, who can then use them to verify if the
quantum seal is still intact.
The additional qubits prepared by Alice correspond to a subset of the
message and control qubits. Alice does not reveal the state of any of the
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qubits, but merely informs the receiver which qubits they correspond to in
the sealed message. For example Bob-1, gets copies1 of qubit state number
1, 7, 16, 30, etc. but he doesn’t know the state, nor does he know if a given
qubit is a message qubit or a control qubit (this issue will be addressed
further below). Similarly, all the other intended readers (Bob-2 to Bob-L)
likewise receive a set of qubits corresponding to a subset of the message
and control qubits.
The verification of the quantum seal as such is done by performing a
so-called SWAP test. A SWAP test can be used to evaluate if two states
are identical, without any knowledge of the states themselves. This means
that Bob-1, for example, can use his subset to make a SWAP test with the
corresponding qubits in the sealed message. If he finds complete agreement,
i.e. if all his qubits pass the SWAP test, he will conclude that the quantum
seal is still intact and the message has not been read. Whereas if he finds
that just one of his qubits fail the SWAP test he will conclude that the seal
has been broken and the message has been read.
The SWAP test works in the following way: Bob chooses the qubit he
wants to test, | φtest 〉, and takes the corresponding qubit from the sealed
message, | φseal 〉, (remember Bob knows which number it corresponds to,
for example, qubit number 1). Then he couples the two qubits with an ad-
ditional qubit, an ancilla, in the state | 0 〉, i.e. Bob now has the three qubit
quantum state | 0 〉| φtest 〉| φseal 〉, and he performs the following operations
one the full system
(H⊗ 1 ⊗ 1 ) (c− SWAP) (H⊗ 1 ⊗ 1 ) | 0 〉| φtest 〉| φseal 〉
=
1
2
| 0 〉 (| φtest 〉| φseal 〉+ | φseal 〉| φtest 〉)
+
1
2
| 1 〉 (| φtest 〉| φseal 〉 − | φseal 〉| φtest 〉) (1)
where H is the Hadamard transformation, 1 the identity operator and
SWAP is the transformation: | φtest 〉| φseal 〉 → | φseal 〉| φtest 〉 and c-SWAP
means that it is a SWAP which is controlled by the ancilla (for a more
detailed description of the SWAP test see [8]). These transformations are
followed by a measurement of the ancilla in the | 0 〉, | 1 〉 basis. The state
| 1 〉 is found with probability 1
2
− 1
2
|〈 φtest | φseal 〉|
2, from which it is seen
that if | φtest 〉 = | φseal 〉, the ancilla will never be found in the state | 1 〉,
but | 0 〉 will always be obtained. In other words if Bob obtains | 1 〉, he will
conclude that the states were not identical, hence they did not pass the
SWAP test.
1Alice can, of course, produce any number of copies of a given state, since she knows the state of
any given qubit. So this does not go against the non-cloning theorem.
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If the sealed message has not been read, all of Bob’s qubits will pass the
SWAP test, whereas if the message has been read some of Bob’s qubit will
fail the SWAP test and he will consequently conclude that the quantum
seal has been broken and assume that the message has been read.
Suppose that Bob’s test qubit is in one of the four states from the x or
the y basis, which means that it is one of the control qubits; and assume
that the message has been read in the z basis (as announced by Alice) then
the control qubit is no longer in its correct state, but in one of the states
from the z basis. If Bob performs a SWAP test, then, since all the involved
states are mutually unbiased, the probability that the SWAP test will fail
is 1
2
− 1
2
|〈 φtest | φseal 〉|
2 = 1
2
− 1
2
1
2
= 1
4
. This means that if Alice supplies Bob
with sufficiently many qubits, so that he can perform many SWAP tests,
statistically Bob should obtain an error and conclude that the seal has been
broken.
Notice one important point namely that the SWAP test does not give
Bob any information about the state, nor will it destroy the seal if it is in-
tact. Which exactly satisfies the intended reader verification requirements:
the quantum seal can be verified without reading nor disturbing the sealed
message.
4 Some security aspects
A fully detailed security analysis of the protocol for quantum seals is beyond
the scope of the present paper. Indeed there may exist many different
implementations of the idea and, most probably, each implementation must
be analyzed independently. Here I mention a few security aspects related
to the presented implementation of the protocol, which may also prove
important to future implementations, and in the next section discuss the
limitation of the proposed implementation.
The encoding: Someone may attempt to read the sealed message by
reading only two out of three qubits in a triplet, hoping to obtain the same
result twice and hence know the bit value without reading all three qubit
states. The hope would be to avoid reading the control qubit and hence
avoid making any errors. But if the sealed message is sufficiently long,
errors should be guaranteed by statistics.
The distribution of subsets of qubits: If Alice provides the intended
readers with the number of the qubits in public this could be exploited
by others to avoid reading exactly those qubits. This means that each
reader should know only his subset of qubits and not the subset of any
other. However, this problem could easily be solved by Alice sending this
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information to each of the intended readers using quantum cryptography.
The nature of the subsets: In each subset some of the qubits should
correspond to message qubits and some will correspond to control qubits.
In principle the message qubits can not be used to check the quantum seal
(they will always pass the SWAP test) only the control qubits can be used
for that. However each intended reader receives both message qubits and
control qubits to avoid that they can use the knowledge of the position of
the control qubits to cheat. The number of qubits supplied to each reader,
should be such that by simply reading the subset he has received he can
not not learn the message, but at the same time he must possess enough
qubits in order to actually check if the quantum seal is still intact (in terms
of good statistics).
5 Limitations of the proposed implementa-
tion
Above it was shown how someone trying to read the sealed message by
measuring each qubit independently will automatically introduce errors,
hence break the quantum seal and unavoidedly be detected.
However, for the proposed implementation, it is possible to completely
avoid detection by making collective measurement on each triplet of qubits,
hence reading the sealed message bit by bit (remember that each bit is en-
coded into three qubits). This is due to the fact that the twelve different
three qubit states which encode bit value 0 are orthogonal to the twelve
three qubit states which encode bit value 1. Indeed all the 0-states lie in
the subspace spanned by the following states (in the z-basis), | 000 〉, | 001 〉,
| 010 〉 and | 100 〉, whereas the 1-states all lie in the orthogonal subspace
spanned by | 111 〉, | 110 〉, | 101 〉 and | 011 〉. This means that a measure-
ment of the corresponding projectors:
P0 = | 000 〉〈 000 |+ | 001 〉〈 001 |+ | 010 〉〈 010 |+ | 100 〉〈 100 |
P1 = | 111 〉〈 111 |+ | 110 〉〈 110 |+ | 101 〉〈 101 |+ | 011 〉〈 011 | (2)
will distingush perfectly between the 0 and 1-states without disturbing the
states. Which means that this kind of collective measurement will allow
someone to read the sealed message without introducing any errors and
hence will avoid detection.
In other words the presented implementation of the protocol is not ro-
bust against collective measurements, but only against single qubit attacks.
However the described implementation serves as a perfect example and il-
lustration of the proporties of the protocol for quantum seals.
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6 Concluding remarks
Quantum seals have been introduced, they can be used to verify if a classical
message encoded into quantum states have been read. A first implementa-
tion of this idea in terms of classical error correcting codes and a so-called
SWAP test has been presented. It has been shown that someone trying
to read the sealed message by measuring each qubit independently will
automatically introduce errors and hence break the quantum seal and be
detected.
However, the proposed implementation is resistant only against single
qubit attacks. Someone who is able to make a collective measurement on
three qubits will be able to read the sealed message without making any
errors. This means that it is an open problem to find an implementation
of the protocol for quantum seals which offers protection against any kind
of attack. A completely secure implementation of quantum seals may very
well require different tools than the classical error correcting codes and the
SWAP test which is used here, for example one could imagine the use of
entanglement and Bell Inequalities.
It should be emphasized that Alice is not committed to the content of
her message, as for the classical seal she is absolutely free to change her
mind, write a new message and seal it. Moreover, one of the basic ideas
is that anyone should be able to read the message written by Alice, which
means that it is not the security of the content which has to be accounted
for, but instead the guarantee that anyone reading the message will actually
leave a trace, i.e. some errors.
Finally notice the following interesting points; The protocol for quantum
seals require no classical communication between Alice and the intended
readers contrary to most other protocols in the area of quantum cryptogra-
phy. A priory it only requires that Alice is able to send quantum states and
make public (classical) announcements. More, the classical seal is a phys-
ical object namely a wax wafer, whereas the quantum seal is somehow a
way of encoding. I do not know of any protocol which can be implemented,
for example, on a classical computer which works as a seal.
Acknowledgements
I would like to thank Andrea Pasquinucci and Adrian Kent for many
stimulating discussions. This work has been supported by the FET Eu-
ropean Networks on Quantum Information and Communication Contract
IST-2000-29681:ASESIT.
8
References
[1] Can be bought in departments stores and paper shops, to be used for
old fashion letter writing or gift wrapping.
[2] For a review on quantum cryptography see for example, N. Gisin, G.
Ribordy, W. Tittel, H. Zbinden, Rev. Mod. Phys. 74, 145 (2002)
[3] A. Kent, quant-ph/9906104 v. 4 and ref. herein.
[4] G. M. D’Ariano, To appear in Proceedings of QCM&C, Boston, July
2002 (Rinton Press), (quanth-ph/0209150) and ref. herein.
[5] H. Azuma and M. Ban, J. Phys. A: Math. Gen. 34, 2723-2741 (2001),
(quant-ph/0006124 v. 3)
[6] H. Barnum, C. Cre´peau, D. Gottesman, A. Smith and A. Tapp,
quant-ph/0205128
[7] See for example, D. Welsh, Codes and Cryptography (Clarendon, Ox-
ford, 1988) or T. M. Cover and J. A. Thomas, Elements of information
Theory (Wiley, New York, 1991)
[8] H. Buhrman, R. Cleve, J. Watrous, R. de Wolf, Phys. Rev. Let. 87,
167902 (2001), (quant-ph/0102001)
9
